Welcome to the "lighter side" of things. Here you will find some great jokes (the Nolo Press Joke Page), cartoons, and some real comedy. Enjoy!

More cartoons

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Read an actual legal answer filed in a lawsuit in
Pasadena, California where the Plaintiff accused the
Defendant of slander for calling him an "asshole."
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Read an actual court opinion by a judge with a sense of humor.
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Here are actual excerpts from letters received by a local
Welfare Department:

I want my money as quick as I can get it. I have been in
bed with the doctor for two weeks and he doesn't do me
any good. If things don't improve, I will have to send for
another doctor.

I am forwarding my marriage certificate and six children. I
have seven but one died which was baptized on a half
sheet of paper.

I am writing the Welfare Department to say that my baby
was born two years old when do I get my money?

Mrs. Jones has not had any clothes for a year and has
been visited regularly by the clergy.

I cannot get sick pay I have six children, can you tell me
why?

I am glad to report that my husband who is missing is
dead.

This is my eighth child. What are you going to do about it?

Please find out for certain if my husband is dead. The
man I am now living with can't eat or do anything until he
knows.

I am very much annoyed to find you have branded my son
as illiterate. This is a dirty lie as I was married a week
before he was born.

I answer to your letter, I have given birth to a boy weighing
ten pounds. I hope this is satisfactory.

I am forwarding my marriage certificate and my three
children. One of which is a mistake as you can see.

My husband got his project cut off two weeks ago and I
haven't had any relief since.

Unless I get my husband's money pretty soon, I will be
forced to lead an immortal life.

You have changed my little boy to a little girl. Will this
make a difference?

I have no children as yet as my husband is a truck driver
and works day and night.

In accordance with your instructions I have given birth to
twins in the enclosed envelope.

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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

As a First Affirmative Defense to Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action,
Defendant alleges as follows:
I. The word "asshole" is not a word of specific generic exactitude. The
word "asshole," when used to describe a physical portion of the human
body, is a void surrounded by the anal sphincter muscle. On the other
hand, when used as a characterization of an individual, the word
"asshole" denotes that the individual possesses some or all of the
following:
a. His acts or omissions do not conform generally to an accepted
pattern among members of a particular social group of which the
individual using the characterization is a member.
b. A person who by his conduct causes derision to be heaped upon
him by one or more other persons.
c. A person whose conduct has attained the degree of contemptibility
such that it defies characterization by any conventional language.
d. A person generally considered by his peers to conduct himself in
such a manner as displays a callous disregard for the feelings of other
human beings and thus deserving of being shunned and ostracized.
II. Defendant did not intend, nor were his remarks understood by
Plaintiff or any other person, to mean that the Plaintiff is in truth and in
fact a void surrounded by the anal sphincter muscle. On the other hand,
Defendant intended, and Plaintiff and others understood Defendant to
mean, that Plaintiff is indeed an "asshole" within the meaning of the
colloquialized characterization of an individual as described above.
III. In truth and in fact, Plaintiff is an "asshole."
The case was dismissed by the Court.

JOHN W. BRADSHAW, Plaintiff, v. UNITY MARINE CORPORATION,
INC.; CORONADO, in rem; and PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. G-00-558 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, GALVESTON DIVISION
147 F. Supp. 2d 668; 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8962; 2001 AMC 2358

OPINION BY: SAMUEL B. KENT

OPINION: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained while working
aboard the M/V CORONADO. Now before the Court is Defendant
Phillips Petroleum Company's ("Phillips") Motion for Summary
Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is
GRANTED.

I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff John W. Bradshaw claims that he was working as a Jones
Act seaman aboard the M/V CORONADO on January 4, 1999. The
CORONADO was not at sea on January 4, 1999, but instead sat [**2]
docked at a Phillips' facility in Freeport, Texas. Plaintiff alleges that he
"sustained injuries to his body in the course and scope of his
employment." The injuries are said to have "occurred as a proximate
result of the unsafe and unseaworthy condition of the tugboat
CORONADO and its appurtenances while docked at the
Phillips/Freeport Dock." Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, which
added Phillips as a Defendant, provides no further information about the
manner in which he suffered injury. However, by way of his Response to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff now avers that "he
was forced to climb on a piling or dolphin to leave the vessel at the time
he was injured." This, in combination with Plaintiff's Complaint,
represents the totality of the information available to the Court respecting
the potential liability of Defendant Phillips. n1

Defendant now contends, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, that
the Texas two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims bars
this action. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code @ 16.003 (Vernon Supp.
2001). Plaintiff suffered injury on January 4, 1999 and filed suit in this
Court on September 15, 2000. However, Plaintiff did not amend his
Complaint to add Defendant Phillips until March 28, 2001, indisputably
more than two-years after the date of his alleged injury. Plaintiff now
responds that he timely sued Phillips, contending that the three-year
federal statute [*670] for maritime personal injuries applies to his action.
See 46 U.S.C. @ 763a.

Before proceeding further, the Court notes that this case involves two
extremely likable lawyers, who have together delivered some of the
mostamateurish pleadings ever to cross the hallowed causeway into
Galveston, an effort which leads the Court to surmise but one plausible
explanation. Both attorneys have obviously entered into a secret
pact--complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic words--to draft their
pleadings entirely in crayon on the back sides of gravy-stained paper
place mats, in the hope that [**4] the Court would be so charmed by
their child-like efforts that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their
briefing would go unnoticed. Whatever actually occurred, the Court is
now faced with the daunting task of deciphering their submissions. With
Big Chief tablet readied, thick black pencil in hand, and a devil-may-care
laugh in the face of death, life on the razor's edge sense of exhilaration,
the Court begins.

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 147 F. Supp. 2d 668, *670; 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
When a motion for summary judgment is made, the nonmoving party
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Therefore, when a defendant
moves for summary judgment based upon an affirmative defense to the
plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff must bear the burden of producing some
evidence to create a fact issue some element of defendant's [**5]
asserted affirmative defense. See Kansa Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v.
Congressional Mortgage Corp. of Texas, 20 F.3d 1362, 1371 (5th Cir.
1994); F.D.I.C. v. Shrader & York, 991 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1993).

Defendant begins the descent into Alice's Wonderland by submitting a
Motion that relies upon only one legal authority. The Motion cites a Fifth
Circuit case which stands for the whopping proposition that a federal
court sitting in Texas applies the Texas statutes of limitations to certain
state and federal law claims. See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016,
1021 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1118 (2000). That is all
well and good--the Court is quite fond of the Erie doctrine; indeed there
is talk of little else around both the Canal and this Court's water cooler.
Defendant, however, does not even cite to Erie, but to a mere
successor case, and further fails to even begin to analyze why the Court
should approach the shores of Erie. Finally, Defendant does not even
provide a cite to its desired Texas limitation statute. n2 A more bumbling
approach is difficult to conceive--but wait folks, There's [**6] More!

Plaintiff responds to this deft, yet minimalist analytical wizardry with
an equally gossamer wisp of an argument, although Plaintiff does at
least cite the federal limitations provision applicable to maritime tort
claims. See 46 U.S.C. @ 763a. Naturally, Plaintiff also neglects to
provide any analysis whatsoever of why his claim versus Defendant
Phillips is a maritime action. Instead, Plaintiff "cites" to a single case
from the Fourth Circuit. Plaintiff's citation, however, points to a
nonexistent Volume "1886" of the Federal Reporter [*671] Third Edition
and neglects to provide a pinpoint citation for what, after being located,
[**7] turned out to be a forty-page decision. Ultimately, to the Court's
dismay after reviewing the opinion, it stands simply for the bombshell
proposition that torts committed on navigable waters (in this case an
alleged defamation committed by the controversial G. Gordon Liddy
aboard a cruise ship at sea) require the application of general maritime
rather than state tort law. See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 524 (4th Cir.
1999) (What the . . .)?! The Court cannot even begin to comprehend
why this case was selected for reference.

It is almost as if Plaintiff's counsel chose the opinion by throwing long
range darts at the Federal Reporter (remarkably enough hitting a
nonexistent volume!). And though the Court often gives great heed to
dicta from courts as far flung as those of Manitoba, it finds this case
unpersuasive. There is nothing in Plaintiff's cited case about ingress or
egress between a vessel and a dock, although counsel must have been
thinking that Mr. Liddy must have had both ingress and egress from the
cruise ship at some docking facility, before uttering his fateful words.

Further, as noted above, Plaintiff has submitted a Supplemental
Opposition to [**8] Defendant's Motion. This Supplement is longer than
Plaintiff's purported Response, cites more cases, several constituting
binding authority from either the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court, and
actually includes attachments which purport to be evidence. However,
this is all that can be said positively for Plaintiff's Supplement, which
does nothing to explain why, on the facts of this case, Plaintiff has an
admiralty claim against Phillips (which probably makes some sense
because Plaintiff doesn't). Plaintiff seems to rely on the fact that he has
pled Rule 9(h) and stated an admiralty claim versus the vessel and his
employer to demonstrate that maritime law applies to Phillips. This
bootstrapping argument does not work; Plaintiff must properly invoke
admiralty law versus each Defendant discretely. See Debellefeuille v.
Vastar Offshore, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 821, 824 (S.D. Tex. 2001)
(discussing this issue and citing authorities). Despite the continued
shortcomings of Plaintiff's supplemental submission, the Court
commends Plaintiff for his vastly improved choice of crayon--Brick Red
is much easier on the eyes than Goldenrod, and stands out much better
amidst [**9] the mustard splotched about Plaintiff's briefing. But at the
end of the day, even if you put a calico dress on it and call it Florence, a
pig is still a pig.

Now, alas, the Court must return to grownup land. As vaguely alluded
to by the parties, the issue in this case turns upon which law--state or
maritime --applies to each of Plaintiff's potential claims versus
Defendant Phillips. And despite Plaintiff's and Defendant's joint, heroic
efforts to obscure it, the answer to this question is readily ascertained.
The Fifth Circuit has held that "absent a maritime status between the
parties, a dock owner's duty to crew members of a vessel using the
dock is defined by the application of state law, not maritime law." Florida
Fuels, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 6 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding that Louisiana premises liability law governed a crew member's
claim versus a dock which was not owned by his employer); accord
Forrester v. Ocean Marine Indem, Co., 11 F.3d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir.
1993). Specifically, maritime law does not impose a duty on the dock
owner to provide a means of safe ingress or egress. See Forrester, 11
F.3d at 1218. [**10] Therefore, because maritime law does not create a
duty on the part of Defendant Phillips vis-a-vis Plaintiff, any claim Plaintiff
does have versus Phillips [*672] must necessarily arise under state law.
n3 See id.; Florida Fuels, 6 F.3d at 332-333, 334.

The Court, therefore, under Erie, applies the Texas statute of
limitations. Texas has adopted a two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury cases. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code @ 16.003.
Plaintiff failed to file his action versus Defendant Phillips within that
two-year time frame. Plaintiff has offered no justification, such as the
discovery rule or other similar tolling doctrines, for this failure.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims versus Defendant Phillips were not timely
filed and are barred. Defendant Phillips' Motion for Summary
[**11]Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's state law claims against
Defendant Phillips are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A Final
Judgment reflecting such will be entered in due course.

II. CONCLUSION

After this remarkably long walk on a short legal pier, having received
no useful guidance whatever from either party, the Court has
endeavored, primarily based upon its affection for both counsel, but also
out of its own sense of morbid curiosity, to resolve what it perceived to
be the legal issue presented. Despite the waste of perfectly good crayon
seen in both parties' briefing (and the inexplicable odor of wet dog
emanating from such) the Court believes it has satisfactorily resolved
this matter. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
At this juncture, Plaintiff retains, albeit seemingly to his befuddlement
and/or consternation, a maritime law cause of action versus his alleged
Jones Act employer, Defendant Unity Marine Corporation, Inc.

However, it is well known around these parts that Unity Marine's
lawyer is equally likable and has been writing crisply in ink since the
second grade. Some old-timers even spin yarns of an ability to type. The
Court [**12] cannot speak to the veracity of such loose talk, but out of
caution, the Court suggests that Plaintiff's lovable counsel had best
upgrade to a nice shiny No. 2 pencil or at least sharpen what's left of the
stubs of his crayons for what remains of this heart-stopping,
spine-tingling action. n4

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

n1 Six days after filing his one-page Response, Plaintiff filed a
Supplemental Opposition to Phillips Petroleum Company's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Although considerably lengthier, the Supplement
provides no further illumination of the factual basis for Plaintiff's claims
versus Phillips.

n2 Defendant submitted a Reply brief, on June 11, 2001, after the Court
had already drafted, but not finalized, this Order. In a regretful effort to be
thorough, the Court reviewed this submission. It too fails to cite to either
the Texas statute of limitations or any Fifth Circuit cases discussing
maritime law liability for Plaintiff's claims versus Phillips.

n3 Take heed and be suitably awed, oh boys and girls--the Court was
able to state the issue and its resolution in one paragraph . . . despite
dozes of pages of gibberish from the parties to the contrary!

n4 In either case, the Court cautions Plaintiff's counsel not to run with a
sharpened writing utensil in hand--he could put his eye out.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

IT IS SO ORDERED. DONE this 26th day of June, 2001, at Galveston,
Texas.

SAMUEL B. KENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE